Ukrainian attack on Russian bombers risks nuclear escalation from Putin: Patrick Mercer

Call me a conspiracy theorist, but there was something deeply sinister about the new chancellor of Germany’s unilateral statement on May 28. He declared that there were no longer any range or targeting restrictions on weapons provided to Ukraine by the West, leading several commentators to wonder what might follow.

Well, the answer came just three days later. Several major Russian airfields suffered ingenious drone attacks which had been concealed in lorries sourced, armed and equipped in the same country. Whilst it’s hard to know exactly how many bombers were destroyed or damaged, it’s clear that the Kremlin has been dealt a serious blow.

There was talk of this being ‘Russia’s Pearl Harbour’ and the daring, unexpected nature of the operation does have similarities. But, whoever coined that phrase needed to think about it a little more carefully because Pearl Harbour brought the USA into the war which, eventually, led to Japan’s utter defeat.

Now that the dust has settled, though, the repercussions of this attack need to be analysed. Most importantly, Ukraine’s targets were not aircraft routinely used against Kyiv’s forces. Rather, they were long range, nuclear tipped bombers and subject to Strategic Arms’ Limitations – that’s why they were parked in the open where they could be studied by NATO satellites in exactly the same way that Russia watches America’s equally exposed bomber fleet.

Certainly, these were legitimate targets, but the operation’s complexity and the choice of aircraft that are part of the delicate balance of deterrence has left many questioning how much help Ukraine got from her allies.

Mr Trump was first to distance himself, telling journalists that he “didn’t like” Kiev’s attack on a key component of Russia’s nuclear forces. He even seemed to endorse retaliation saying, “Well, they gave Putin a reason to go in and bomb the hell out of them last night”, “When I saw it, I said: ‘Here we go… now it’s going to be a strike.’”

But when Russia directly suggested that Britain – specifically MI6 – might be involved, there was no denial from London, just the usual boilerplate “we don’t comment on operational matters”. That may be a handy swerve, but it doesn’t address Russia’s suspicions that the operation was led by Britain with help from the other, willing partners.

First, the timing of the attack was exquisite. Moscow frequently rotates her bombers for maintenance and to keep the West guessing. To attack, almost simultaneously, at least four, disparate bases many miles from Ukraine and and when the optimum number of targets were vulnerable takes sophisticated surveillance: that’s beyond Kiev’s capabilities.

To prove that, remember when Mr Trump briefly suspended intelligence and surveillance support to Ukraine? The effect was immediate and contributed heavily to Kyiv’s withdrawal from the Kursk operation.

Next, Britain has announced plans to build 100,000 drones this year following Kyiv’s specifications. Certainly, those weapons are intended to be used over Ukraine and Russia, but it’s clear that the Kremlin is sceptical about which country’s operators will really be piloting them.

Then there’s Sir Keir Starmer’s brassy call to arms “We are moving to war-fighting readiness as the central purpose of our armed forces”. Now, just assume for a moment that the Kremlin hasn’t heard our Defence Secretary saying that Britain isn’t ready to fight a war and doesn’t realise that our proposed increase in defence spending is nothing more than a weak joke.

Then add the fiery comments from Fiona Hill, a former intelligence advisor to President Trump and now one of the three experts who compiled the UK’s latest strategic defence review. She said that “Russia has hardened in a way that we probably hadn’t fully anticipated”, is becoming the “dominant military power in all of Europe” and is “at war with Britain.”

What is Russia to make of all this? Whether we like it or not, we ought to care what Russia thinks, for last autumn – with exactly this sort of situation in mind – the Kremlin altered its nuclear response doctrine. That now allows any conventional attack on Russia’s nuclear forces to met with a nuclear reply, criteria that Kyiv and her partners have now squarely met.

The problem for Russia is that every time the West steps over one of her ‘red lines’ not much happens. It looks as though this latest challenge will be met simply by more missile attacks on Ukraine. Whilst that’s deeply unpleasant for the victims, it’s not going to stop Europe’s support – at least not just yet.

And that is exactly the calculated risk that Sir Keir and his partners have to weigh up. No matter how much the willing nations try to deny it, it’s their resources and leadership which are proving to be Ukraine’s lifeline. But how much further can the Europeans push their luck?

Things have changed now that the US shield is disappearing. Now, instead of being confronted by the might of America Russia is only faced by the rag tag, cash strapped and peace-fattened Europeans.

Then consider this quote from the Institute for the Study of War: “Russia appears to be setting conditions to withdraw from international arms control treaties, likely as part of preparation for a… future war with NATO.”

Every day I reckon that Starmer, Merz and Macron all look in the mirror and see Churchill, Bismark and Napoleon staring back. They would be wise not to confuse ambition with ability.

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